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Part-1

Trump's Electoral Defeat: The Domestic Political Consequences of the War in the United States

Introduction: A War That Extends Beyond the Battlefield

Recent developments in the Middle East indicate that the military confrontation between Iran, the United States and Israel has moved beyond the confines of a regional war and has become a significant factor shaping the political, economic and electoral calculations of the powers involved.

The Republican Party's heavy defeat in the US midterm elections, the loss of the parliamentary majority by Benjamin Netanyahu's governing coalition in Israel, and the rising economic and security costs of the war have raised new questions about the original objectives of the confrontation, the military achievements of the parties involved, and the future direction of US policy in the Middle East.

Against this backdrop, a fundamental question arises: Has the US-Israeli military attack on Iran achieved the strategic objectives envisaged by its architects, or has

a war launched with the aim of weakening Iran itself become a factor undermining the political standing of the leaders of the United States and Israel?

To address this question, developments must be examined across several interconnected dimensions.

1. Trump's Electoral Defeat: The Domestic Political Consequences of the War in the United States

The US midterm elections of 3 November 2026 dealt a severe blow to the Republican Party and Donald Trump personally. The Democrats secured majorities in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, marking the first time during Trump's second presidential term that his party has lost control of both chambers of Congress. This outcome represents a significant political setback for the Trump administration and is likely to complicate its legislative agenda during the remainder of his term

According to Reuters, the Democrats secured at least 54 seats in the Senate and gained at least 30 seats in the House of Representatives. Dissatisfaction with the war in Iran, the rising cost of living, trade tariff policies, and concerns about the administration's performance were among the major factors influencing voters' decisions. The results reflected broader public discontent with the administration's domestic and foreign policies, with the war in Iran emerging as one of the significant issues affecting the electoral outcome

According to the BBC, five major factors help explain why the Republicans lost so many seats in the midterm elections:

1. Soaring cost of living

From coast to coast, voters across the United States have been grappling with the soaring cost of essential goods and services. That anger was palpable on the ground in key electoral races.

Changes in the price at the pump: The price of petrol and fuel has also increased, adding to the financial pressure on American households.

2. The unpopular war with Iran

A major factor contributing to rising prices has been the war with Iran, which the United States and Israel launched in February. Fuel prices then surged after Tehran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation, disrupting a key artery for the passage of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG).

3. A disciplined message from the Democrats

The scale and breadth of the Democratic electoral wave were made possible by strong candidates who presented themselves as authentic, particularly in traditional Republican strongholds.

4. Trump's unpopularity becoming a burden on the Republicans

Two of the issues about which voters expressed the greatest dissatisfaction — soaring prices and the war with Iran — were directly linked to the president. Consequently, public dissatisfaction with Trump's policies also affected Republican candidates.

5. Hispanic and Black voters shift again

Two years earlier, a shift towards the Republicans among some Hispanic and Black voters had helped Trump secure a decisive victory. However, that trend appears to have reversed in these midterm elections. The Democrats won all three House races in the overwhelmingly Hispanic congressional districts along the Texas–Mexico border.

The significance of this defeat becomes even clearer when one considers that Trump himself played an active role in the Republicans' election campaign and urged voters to endorse his administration's record.

Following the announcement of the results, Vice-President JD Vance identified the war in Iran as one of the principal reasons for the Republicans' defeat. Trump himself also acknowledged that the war had played a part in the election outcome, although he continued to defend his decision to enter the conflict. These statements are significant because they indicate that the political consequences of the war were recognised even within the Republican leadership.

Anthony Zurcher, a BBC analyst, makes an important point in his article entitled "Midterm Carnage Weakens Trump, but He Still Wields Power for Now": electoral defeat does not mean the end of presidential authority. Trump can still exercise his executive powers, command the armed forces and use the presidential veto. However, from this point onwards, he is likely to face more intensive congressional scrutiny and stronger political resistance from the Democrats.

In a related analysis, Jeremy Bowen, the BBC's International Editor, emphasises that Trump's domestic electoral setback does not necessarily diminish his capacity to exercise power abroad. The US president remains Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and retains extensive authority over foreign policy.

This point is particularly significant for the future of the war in Iran, as Trump may seek to compensate for his domestic political defeat by projecting strength on the international stage.

Corey Alpert, an analyst at the Lowy Institute in Australia, makes a similar observation in his 5 November article, entitled “Trump Lost the Midterms, Not Control of Foreign Policy”. In his view, despite the electoral defeat, Trump retains considerable authority over foreign policy. Nevertheless, he now faces a more precarious and uncertain political position, which may lead him either to retreat from his costly policies or to pursue them with even greater determination.

It would therefore be unrealistic to expect that the Democrats’ victory will bring about an immediate change in US policy towards Iran. Within the structure of American foreign policy, strategic interests, security institutions, the military-industrial sector and regional commitments are among the factors that cannot easily be transformed simply by a change in the governing party.

From this perspective, the Persian proverb “A yellow dog is the brother of a jackal” may express a critical view of the continuity of certain US policies towards Iran. Nevertheless, the genuine differences between Democrats and Republicans in their approaches to crisis management, diplomacy and the use of military power cannot be dismissed.

The central point is that Trump has been weakened domestically but retains the power to make decisions on the international stage. This combination could push the war in Iran into an even less predictable phase.

2. Netanyahu’s Political Crisis: The Defeat of the Right-Wing Coalition and the Deadlock in Government Formation

On the other side of this equation, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is also facing one of the most difficult political periods of his tenure.

The Israeli parliamentary elections were held on 27 October 2026. The final results showed that Netanyahu’s right-wing and religious bloc secured 53 of the Knesset’s 120 seats. The opposition bloc, led by Gadi Eisenkot, secured 48 seats, while the Arab-led parties, comprising the Joint List and Ra’am, won 19 seats. With 61 seats required to secure a parliamentary majority, neither of the two principal blocs obtained enough seats to form a government independently.

The electoral outcome was followed by public demonstrations in several Israeli cities, including the three cities shown in footage of protests against Netanyahu. Demonstrators expressed strong dissatisfaction with his leadership and demanded

political change. These protests reflected the growing domestic tensions surrounding the government's policies, the consequences of the war, and the political future of the country. However, public demonstrations alone cannot remove a prime minister; a change of government requires the necessary parliamentary support and the formation of an alternative governing arrangement.

The central political challenge is therefore the formation of an effective parliamentary coalition. The opposition's 48 seats, combined with the 19 seats held by Arab-led parties, would theoretically provide 67 seats. Nevertheless, this numerical majority does not automatically translate into a functioning coalition. Differences among opposition parties, particularly over cooperation with Arab political representatives, remain significant obstacles.

Gadi Eisenkot has received the backing of 67 lawmakers in consultations with President Isaac Herzog, but this endorsement should not be confused with a completed coalition agreement. The Arab-led parties themselves also have different positions: Ra'am has expressed willingness to join a government under certain conditions, while the Joint List has indicated a preference for supporting political change from outside the government.

However, the significance of this result cannot be reduced to electoral figures alone. The fundamental issue lies in the political and ideological obstacles to cooperation between the parties.

Given the ideological structure of Netanyahu's right-wing coalition and the influence of hard-line Zionist factions, he is effectively unwilling to form a governing coalition with Arab parties. On the other hand, many of his opponents, despite opposing the continuation of Netanyahu's premiership, are themselves unwilling to rely on the support of Arab parties to establish a government.

For example, Avigdor Lieberman, leader of Yisrael Beiteinu, has rejected cooperation with Arab parties. Gadi Eisenkot, a leading opposition figure, also faces constraints and opposition within his own political camp. By contrast, Yair Golan, leader of the Democrats Party, has called for cooperation with Arab parties to remove Netanyahu from power.

Thus, although the Arab parties' 19 seats are potentially decisive in parliamentary calculations, they do not necessarily translate into the formation of a coalition government.

This is precisely the political deadlock to which Israeli political analysts have also drawn attention: Netanyahu's opponents may be able to command a parliamentary majority in terms of seat numbers, but political and ideological

divisions make it difficult for them to translate that majority into a unified governing coalition.

These developments place Netanyahu in his most serious parliamentary predicament in the current political cycle. Nevertheless, until a new government is formally established, he remains prime minister in a caretaker capacity. If negotiations fail, the country could face another election, prolonging the political uncertainty.

Beyond its domestic implications, this political crisis raises important questions about the future direction of Israeli regional policy. A change in government could create an opportunity to reconsider the costs and consequences of military confrontation, particularly in relations with Iran and other Middle Eastern countries. However, the removal of Netanyahu would not necessarily mean an immediate transformation of Israel's security doctrine or its strategic objectives towards Iran. Several opposition figures also maintain hard-line positions on national security and regional competition.

The broader question is whether Israel's next political leadership will continue to rely primarily on military pressure and regional confrontation or seek a more sustainable framework based on diplomacy, security arrangements and the reduction of regional tensions. Relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Egypt and the Gulf states will remain important tests of this policy direction.

Taken together, the electoral setback of Netanyahu's bloc, the mobilisation of opposition forces and the public demonstrations indicate that the consequences of the war extend beyond the battlefield. They have become part of a wider domestic political crisis, challenging the stability of the governing establishment and raising questions about the effectiveness of military power in achieving long-term strategic objectives.

Nevertheless, the future regional consequences will depend not only on the identity of Israel's next prime minister but also on the policies of the United States, the evolving regional balance of power and the willingness of the parties involved to pursue diplomatic alternatives to further military confrontation.

The Political Survival of Netanyahu and the Risk of Nuclear Escalation

The growing danger of this conflict cannot be understood solely through its military dimensions. It must also be examined in the context of Benjamin Netanyahu's domestic political and legal predicament. His government faces serious political challenges, while his ongoing legal proceedings and the

possibility of losing political power add another dimension to the crisis. These circumstances raise a broader analytical question: to what extent might the political survival of a leader influence decisions concerning the continuation or escalation of a war?

In this context, retired US Army Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, a former chief of staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, has raised an alarming possibility. In an interview with Democracy Now! on 10 March 2026, Wilkerson warned that Netanyahu might resort to nuclear weapons against Iran if the military situation deteriorated further for Israel. This should be understood as Wilkerson's personal assessment of a potential worst-case scenario, not as evidence of an established Israeli decision or operational plan. Nevertheless, the warning deserves consideration because of the catastrophic consequences that any nuclear escalation would have for the region and the wider international community.

The underlying concern is that the political calculations of a leader facing mounting domestic pressures could become intertwined with decisions carrying consequences far beyond his own political future. If the preservation of political power takes precedence over the security and interests of the population, the risks of reckless escalation and strategic miscalculation become particularly serious. Netanyahu's political and legal difficulties therefore form an important part of the wider analysis of the war, although his motives and any possible future decisions must be assessed on the basis of evidence rather than assumption.

Another major obstacle to a diplomatic settlement is the profound erosion of trust between Tehran and Washington. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has publicly stated that Iran no longer trusts negotiations with the United States, pointing to previous rounds of diplomatic engagement that were followed by military attacks and further sanctions. Iranian officials have consequently questioned the credibility of written American commitments and the reliability of any future agreement that is not supported by credible guarantees and practical mechanisms for compliance. This breakdown of confidence makes diplomatic negotiations considerably more difficult and increases the danger that misunderstandings or renewed confrontation could replace political engagement.

Taken together, Netanyahu's domestic political predicament, the possibility of extreme military escalation, Iran's demonstrated capacity to resist, and the collapse of mutual confidence between Tehran and Washington illustrate how the war has evolved beyond a conventional military confrontation. Its consequences now extend to the credibility of international commitments, regional stability and the wider security architecture. The security and future of an entire region must not become hostage to the political survival calculations of individual leaders.

3. The US Congressional Research Service Assessment and Iran's Capacity to Resist

A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report published in September 2026 also assesses the war as gradually evolving into a war of attrition. It continues to emphasise the claim that Iran faces economic and military constraints. However, this assessment does not adequately take into account Iran's capacity for resistance and its ability to withstand the economic and military pressures imposed by the aggressors.

Despite the damage and pressures resulting from the war, Iran has been able to sustain its resistance and impose considerable costs on the attacking parties.

PART TWO

2. Netanyahu’s Political Crisis: Continued Pressures and the Prospects for Political Survival

An analytical report by the US Congressional Research Service (CRS), dated 30 October, also addresses this issue. The report identifies three factors as important to Israel’s political future: the possibility of forming a national unity government, the prospect of cooperation between some opposition parties and Arab parties, and the possibility of holding another election.

Meanwhile, Netanyahu faces corruption charges and the possibility of mounting pressure for an investigation into the security failures of 7 October 2023. His departure from office could further complicate his political and legal position.

Under these circumstances, the continuation of the security and military situation may be politically significant for Netanyahu. He may seek to use external threats to maintain unity within the right-wing camp and place pressure on his political opponents.

As observed, according to analysts, all of Netanyahu’s military policies are motivated solely by his personal desire to remain in power. Nevertheless, the influence of his political survival on his wartime calculations cannot be overlooked.

3. The Transfer of US Military Equipment to Israel: A Sign of Preparations for Another Round of War?

One of the notable developments in recent days has been reports concerning the transfer of US military equipment to Israel.

According to a report published by The Times of Israel on 29 October, more than ten US military transport aircraft landed at airbases in southern Israel during the preceding week. These aircraft had reportedly departed mainly from Biggs Army Airfield in Texas.

The precise contents of the cargo have not been officially disclosed. However, military analysts have suggested that the equipment may be associated with strengthening Israel’s air defence systems and preparing for the possibility of another round of confrontation with Iran. There have also been reports concerning the transfer of Patriot missile systems.

At this point, it is important to distinguish between the transfer of defensive equipment and the deployment of offensive forces. These transfers, on their own, do not establish that a definitive decision has been made to launch a new attack, particularly given the history of previous attacks on Iran.

Nevertheless, the timing of these movements is particularly significant, given that Trump has suffered an electoral defeat while Netanyahu is also seeking to preserve his political position.

One possibility is that Israel intends to strengthen its defensive capabilities in preparation for continued confrontation with Iran. Another is that these movements form part of preparations for a new offensive operation.

In either case, Israel's continued military dependence on the United States demonstrates that Washington still plays a decisive role in the region's security calculations. But, so far, Trump has not gained any tangible outcome in the war with Iran.

4. The Risk of Information Warfare and Allegations of Chemical Weapons Use

Another issue that requires careful examination is the possibility that allegations concerning the use of chemical weapons could be exploited for political and propaganda purposes.

In contemporary warfare, military operations are not confined to the battlefield. Information warfare, propaganda, psychological operations, and efforts to secure the support of public opinion and foreign governments constitute important elements of the strategies pursued by the parties involved.

If allegations were made that Iran had used chemical weapons against its opponents or other targets, such accusations could provide grounds for international pressure and even be used to justify further military action.

For this reason, the possibility of fabricated allegations, deception operations, and attempts to attribute one party's actions to another must also be taken into account in security analysis.

Some observers have raised concerns that Israel might seek to exploit allegations of chemical weapons use, or create circumstances in which such allegations could be made against Iran, to obtain international justification for renewed military action. However, this remains an allegation and has not been independently established.

No specific claim that Israel is planning such an operation has, to date, been substantiated by independent and verifiable evidence. This issue should therefore be treated as a possible scenario, rather than an established fact.

In such circumstances, any allegation of chemical weapons use must be assessed through independent investigations, examination of field evidence, and the

findings of experts from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

More importantly, if Iran's existence and security were to face a serious threat, Tehran might also resort to the full range of its military and strategic capabilities to defend the country. Such a situation could considerably widen the scope of the war.

5. The War's Implications for Opponents of the Islamic Republic and Supporters of a Return to the Monarchy

Trump's electoral defeat carries a significant political message for those opponents of the Islamic Republic who have placed their principal hopes in US and Israeli military intervention and the restoration of the monarchy through foreign support.

These developments demonstrate that the policies of major powers are not necessarily shaped by the wishes and aspirations of political groups opposed to existing governments.

Political, propaganda or military support from a foreign country does not, in itself, guarantee any political movement domestic legitimacy, a social support base or the capacity to govern a country.

In this context, it is important to distinguish between opposition to the Islamic Republic and support for the restoration of the monarchy. Not all opponents of the Islamic Republic favour a monarchical system, and the various forces opposing Iran's government cannot be treated as a single political movement.

Nor can Trump's electoral defeat be interpreted as signalling the end of US support for opponents of the Islamic Republic. However, this defeat may raise serious doubts among those who have counted on Washington's unconditional support.

Ultimately, Iran's political future will depend on the wishes of the Iranian people, domestic developments, the country's social and political structures, and the ability of different political forces to present an acceptable alternative—not merely on the support of foreign powers.

6. Have the United States and Israel Achieved Their Strategic Objectives in the War Against Iran?

To assess this question, it is necessary to distinguish between military superiority, operational achievements and the fulfilment of political and strategic objectives.

A country may enjoy air and weapons superiority on the battlefield, target its adversary's military installations and inflict severe damage upon them. However, such superiority does not necessarily mean that the political and strategic objectives of the war have been achieved.

In her analysis, Sanam Vakil discusses the claims made by the United States and Israel that they have succeeded in penetrating Iran's air defence systems and inflicting damage on its nuclear and military facilities. However, these claims, particularly those concerning the extent of the damage and the degree of operational success, have not been fully corroborated by independent and impartial sources. Such statements should therefore be assessed with caution, and a clear distinction must be maintained between the military and propaganda claims of the parties involved and independently established facts.

The wider strategic significance of these claims, and the limits of the military achievements they describe, are examined further in Part Three.

PART THREE

The Future of the Middle East – Three Possible Scenarios

The Military Balance and the Limits of Strategic Victory

In this context, Sanam Vakil, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at the respected Chatham House think tank, makes an important observation in her analysis of the US–Iran ceasefire of 22 June 2026.

She explains that the United States and Israel claim to have succeeded in penetrating Iran's air defence systems and inflicting damage on its nuclear and military facilities. However, the actual extent of the damage, particularly to Iran's nuclear infrastructure, remains uncertain, and the full status of the nuclear sites has yet to be established.

The United States and Israel initially launched their military offensive against Iran without sufficient justification, with the apparent objective of overthrowing the Iranian government. However, despite their military superiority and initial attacks, they failed to achieve this objective. They were unable to translate their military advantage into regime change or Iran's rapid political capitulation.

Iran, meanwhile, despite sustaining heavy losses, managed to continue resisting and impose considerable costs on its adversaries through regional attacks and threats to the security of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran's continued resistance challenged the perceived military superiority of both the United States and Israel.

However, these claims have not been supported by sufficient independent and verifiable evidence to establish the actual extent of the damage or the degree to which Iran's air defence capabilities have been neutralised. If the United States and Israel had achieved the level of military success suggested by these claims, an important question would arise: why do they continue to contemplate further military attacks against Iran?

The possibility of further attacks does not, by itself, disprove that Iran's air defence systems were penetrated or that military damage was inflicted. Nevertheless, it raises legitimate questions about the extent of the operational achievements and whether they have translated into the strategic outcomes initially sought by the United States and Israel.

This assessment highlights one of the most important lessons for understanding the nature of the war: military superiority does not necessarily translate into strategic victory.

A September 2026 report by the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) also characterises the conflict as increasingly becoming a war of attrition. In this situation, it I claimed that Iran faces significant economic and military constraints, but the resistance of Iran conveys a different issue. But, the United States, Israel and their regional partners proved that they have limited capacity to sustain the military, economic and political costs indefinitely.

The report estimates that the cost of US military operations had reached approximately US$38 billion by 1 August 2026.

Therefore, declaring either side a complete military loser without carefully examining its achievements and losses would be premature. What can be said at this stage is the aggressors and initiators of unjustified war has neither managed to achieve any of their intended strategic objectives.

Politically, the continuation of the war, rising military expenditure and expanding regional insecurity have also become serious concerns for Washington and Tel Aviv.

7. **The Future of the Middle East: Three Possible Scenarios**

In light of these developments, three possible paths can be envisaged for the future of the war and the broader geopolitical landscape of the Middle East.

Scenario One: De-escalation and a Return to Diplomacy

Under this scenario, Trump's electoral defeat, pressure from Congress, the rising costs of the war and Netanyahu's political difficulties could create conditions for reducing tensions and initiating a new round of negotiations, after accepting the conditions of Iran.

In such circumstances, the way for the United States to extricate itself from this protracted conflict would be to return to an agreement it had previously proposed to Iran, rather than continuing costly military operations, but subsequently violated despite existing commitments and understandings.

Washington should honour its agreements and commitments and, instead of relying on propaganda narratives surrounding Iran's nuclear programme, pursue negotiations and mutual understanding by addressing Iran's demands and resolving the issue of the Strait of Hormuz.

Scenario Two: A Protracted War of Attrition and Reciprocal Pressure

Under this scenario, neither side would be willing to make a complete retreat. The United States and Israel would continue their military, economic and intelligence pressure, while Iran would use its missile, drone, regional and strategic capabilities, and unused weaponry to impose further costs on its adversaries.

This scenario could prolong the crisis, increase energy costs, undermine the security of trade routes and intensify political divisions within the countries involved.

Scenario Three: Renewed Escalation and the Involvement of Additional Actors

The most dangerous scenario would be the launch of broader attacks and the conflict's escalation beyond the control of its principal parties.

Under such circumstances, other regional countries could become directly or indirectly involved. Threats to the Strait of Hormuz, energy infrastructure, military bases and maritime shipping routes could expose the global economy to a new crisis.

The possibility that Netanyahu might seek greater US involvement in military operations against Iran in an attempt to reshape the political and military balance cannot be dismissed. However, Washington must also consider the domestic and international consequences of such a decision.

Conclusion: Electoral Defeat – A Warning Sign for the War Policies of Washington and Tel Aviv

Recent developments indicate that the war involving Iran has become more than a military and security issue; it has also emerged as a factor influencing the political structures of the countries involved.

In the United States, voters have expressed their dissatisfaction with the Trump administration's performance, including the war with Iran and its economic costs, through the Republicans' defeat in both chambers of Congress. This outcome places further political constraints on the President, although his constitutional powers over military and foreign affairs remain intact.

In Israel, Netanyahu has also lost his parliamentary majority and faces difficulties in forming a new government. The 19 seats held by Arab parties could prove decisive in parliamentary calculations. However, ideological barriers and opposition from a significant section of Zionist parties and right-wing opponents of Netanyahu limit the possibility of turning this parliamentary strength into a governing coalition.

Meanwhile, opponents of the Islamic Republic who have placed their hopes in US and Israeli military and political support to bring them to power should reconsider their calculations. Trump's electoral defeat has demonstrated that even powerful leaders cannot pursue their war policies indefinitely without paying political and economic costs.

Nevertheless, it would be mistaken to assume that changes in the parliamentary balance in the United States alone can transform the country's foreign policy. Power structures, strategic interests and security commitments between the United States and Israel will continue to play a significant role in shaping the course of regional developments.

In my view, the most important issue at present is that a war launched with the objective of weakening Iran has itself become a factor undermining the political standing of leaders in Washington and Tel Aviv, although the final outcome of this confrontation remains uncertain.

If the leaders of the United States and Israel fail to learn from the experience of this war and continue to prioritise military solutions over diplomacy, the Middle East could enter an even more dangerous phase of instability.

The fundamental question is this: Will Trump's electoral defeat and Netanyahu's parliamentary crisis mark a turning point towards ending the policy

of military confrontation with Iran, or will these two leaders, in an attempt to compensate for their political setbacks, push the region towards another round of war?

The answer to this question could determine the future course of the Middle East.

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Analytical Sources and Perspectives

To maintain the academic credibility and impartiality of this article, the following supportive and opposing perspectives, together with research sources, have informed the analysis:

1. BBC – Anthony Zurcher, 5 November 2026: “Midterm Carnage Weakens Trump, but He Still Wields Power for Now”. An examination of Trump’s declining political power following the electoral defeat and the continuation of presidential powers.

2. BBC – Jeremy Bowen, November 2026: An analysis of the domestic implications of Trump’s electoral defeat and the possibility that he may continue projecting American power abroad.

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4. Congressional Research Service (CRS), 30 October 2026: An examination of the Israeli election results and possible scenarios for government formation.

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8. Reuters – Samia Nakhoul, 28 October 2026: An examination of Netanyahu's position following the election and the difficulties involved in forming a new coalition.

9. Democracy Now!, 10 March 2026: "Ret. Col. Lawrence Wilkerson: Netanyahu Could Turn to Nuclear Bombs If Iran War Escalates". Interview and full transcript.

10. Al Jazeera, 26 September 2026: "Pezeshkian says Iran 'no longer trusts talks with Washington'".