Abdul Ali Faiq

By: Abdul Ali Faiq

Introduction

Twentieth first century seems to be the era of conflicts and wars. This is not ‘the end of history’ as Francis Fukuyama has claimed. The past decades have witnessed many conflicts and turbulent events. Even now, there are more challenging and defining moment of the winds of change, which are blowing across the Arab world, European debt turmoil, the emergence of new economic powers and the global War on Terror. Therefore, it is crucial to understand different theories and approaches, that how these prospectives are describing and prescribing the world and how they are managing and resolving the conflicts. Thus, this paper will initially highlight the descriptions (diagnoses) of four perspectives on group conflict in Iraq. Secondly, it will look into what prescriptions (medicines) do they offer for managing that conflict.

Primordialist

First, this paper highlights the view of Primodialist about Iraq’s conflict and what is their description and prescription for the conflict? Primordialist believes that nation and nationality are natural and it has been with us since the beginning of mankind's creation. According to (Umut Ozkirimli, 2010:49) “Primordialism is an umbrella term used to describe the belief that nationality is a ‘natural’ part of human beings.” (Ernest Gellner, 2006: 6) also indicates that: “A man must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two ears.” They believe that, nationality and ethnic identity are genetic, which are in our blood, they are fixed at birth and cannot change.  (Sandra F.Joireman, 2003:19) points out that: “Primordialism assumes that a person’s fundamental ethnic identity is fixed at birth and cannot change.”  

Before moving on, one needs to understand what nationalism is. There are numerous debates among academics in this subject and every one of them has their own definitions. For instance, (Hans Kohn, 1965: 9) defines: “Nationalism is a state of mind.” (Anthony D. Smith, 1971:164) states: “Nationalism as self-centred collective resistance to foreign rule to preserve the group and its culture.” As (Ernest Gellner, 2006:1) points out: “Nationalism is primarily a political principle.” And (Benedict Anderson) also defines: “it is an imagined political community.” In this case, nationalism is - conceptually, empirically and normatively - a controversial and contested concept, which proves difficult to define.

Regarding Primordialism’s view on the Iraq conflict. As (David Storey, 2006:52) argues that: “Primordialists see that nations or nationalism as having quite deep-seated historical origins.” From this analogy, one can argue that since 1979, when Saddam Hussein became the President of Iraq, the real game started; the economic and militarily powers shifted to a dominant totalitarian Sunni group. As John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary explain the process on this way: “The key problem within Iraq is that important elements within the Sunni Arab community remain wedded to a vision of the past in which it was hegemonic.” Other ethnic groups were systematically alienated and marginalized. Therefore, the Sunnis, Shias and Kurds became reluctant to co-exist in peace and unity, as (Sandra F.Joireman, 2003:19) said: “because their inherent ethnic identities put them at odds with each other.”

Having said that, what is their prescription for the conflict then? According to (Toby Dodge, 2007:1) “The dominant approach used to explain Iraq’s descent into civil war and to draft policy proposals to end the violence is simply to impose a primordial template onto the political and societal complexities of the situations.” David Phillips, for example, claims: “Iraq lacks a sense of national identity. They are deeply divided along ethnic and sectarian lines.” Leslie Gelb and Peter Galbraith have become the chief promoters of this approach. For them Iraq has “three distinct and sectarian communities, Sunni, Shia, and Kurd.” Furthermore, (Timonthy D. Sisk, 2003: 148) also emphasises that: “In the most desperate cases, partition should not be abandoned as a viable option to end the violence of an ethnic civil war (as in Sudan).” He goes on and argues: “At some point, it becomes impossible to live together in broad, in such cases, perhaps consociational democracy is the best alternative to violence. When consociationalism cannot work, autonomy might be a solution. When even autonomy is not possible, the time may be ripe to consider partition.” (Ibid: 148)

Consequently, Primordialists are in favour of segregation, repartition and have a clear tendency for a strong intervention and partition. (Stephen Van Evera, 2001:21) argues that: “it suggests that prescriptions drawn from the U.S. experience will likely fail in non-immigrant societies. Americans cannot bring ethnic peace to other lands just by advertising the American example of mutual-ethnic tolerance. Ethnic groups in Bosnia, Iraq, Sri Lanka and the Caucasus cohabit in a non- immigrant setting to which American experience is largely irrelevant.” In this case, Primordialists describe Iraq as a multi-ethnic state, which is divided along ethnic lines. Therefore, they tend to prescribe an ethno-religionists or a state for each ethnic sect. For example, Kurds, should have their own, i.e. ‘Kurdistan’, Sunni Arab should have their own as ‘Arabistan’ and Shia Arabs might have their own state as ‘Shaiaistatn’. From Primordialism perspective, they cannot live with each other because of their different ethnic animosities.

Ethnosympolist

Ethnosympolists are shifting to Primordialists with a minor different approach. In another words, the Ethnosympolists’s description and prescription are quite relevant to the primordalisits with slight differences. For example, Ethnoymbolist see nationality as a fixed concept with very little change. They emphasise typically on cultural issue and argue that ethnic nationalism is inevitable. They do not have a sheer tendency towards integration and are pro-ethno-national state with limited intervention.

Ethnosympolists describe that Kurds, Shias, Sunnis and other Iraqi ethnic groups are not willing to live in an unified Iraq because of their ethnic and historical tensions. For instance, (Peter W. Galbraith, 2006: 206-7), who is an ethnosymbolist, concluded by arguing that: “Iraq’s three-state solution could lead to the country’s dissolution. There will be no reason to mourn Iraq’s passing. Iraq has brought virtually nonstop misery to the 8 percent of its people who are not Sunni Arab and could be held together only by force. Almost certainly, Kurdistan’s full Independence is just a matter of time.”

Galbraith argues that America has got the wrong end of the stick and has misunderstood Iraq’s history. He believes that peace cannot simply come from the barrel of a gun, nor it is possible to impose national unity by force, by bribing tribal leaders or by giving the power to one ethnic group. He goes on and says: “American policy makers are reflexively committed to the unity of Iraq as they were to the unity of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia... This is a misreading of Iraq’s modern history. Today, America’s failed effort to build a united and democratic Iraq has spawned a ferocious insurgency and a Shiite theocracy.” (Ibid)

Galbraith also insists that his experiences and visits to the many parts of the country show that achieving unity in Iraq is far from reality. There is little evidence to demonstrate that unity and solidarity exist amongst rival factions in many part of Iraq. Specifically, among Kurds. As (Galbraith, 2006: 99) put the matter on this way: “I knew every Kurdish leader that Rice had met with, and I know not one wanted a united Iraq. Even a casual visitor to Erbil, Kurdistan’s capital, notices the Kurdistan flag that flies everywhere. Kurdistan has its own army and does not allow the new Iraqi Army on its territory…. They hate the country and are not shy about saying so. Understanding this does not require sophisticated analysis.” Therefore, Ethnosympolist’s prescription for Iraq could be a self-determination, consociationalism, segregation or partition. 

Instrumentalist

In the case of instrumentalism, their description and prescription are virtually divergent from both Primordialist and Ethnosympolist. They believe that ethnicity, social class and sectarianism are not the real challenging issues in Iraq as pointed out by (Jonathan Steele, 2008:198) who argues: “In spite of this bloody start, sectarianism has only been used as a political weapon during rare periods of Iraq’s history. For most of the time it was not a source of hostility of violence but simply a cultural and social fact of life, and often a mark of class.” Instrumentalist describes Iraq as a unified state. They are quite optimistic about Iraq’s future and pessimistic of nationalism and sectarianism.

Instrumentalists strongly oppose nationalism as they see it as a political tool at the hand of political elite. They also believe that nation-state is a recent invention and nations and nationalism are the products of social engineering ‘‘Traditions’ which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented.” (Eric Hobsbawm 1983:1) They argue that it was the political elite who constructed and invented national identity, flag, symbols and tradition. So, they also created war in Iraq to manipulate public feelings, ethnicity and nationalism for the only reason of holding on to power and prestige. Paul R. Brass argues: “ethnic and national identities become convenient tools at the hands of competing elites for generating mass support in the universal struggle for wealth, power and prestige.” Cited in (Ozkirimli, 2010: 88)

Instrumentalists also believe that nationalism is bad and national identity is malleable. They tend to promote integration and civil society. They accept that ‘segregation reproduces antagonism and integration can be a catalyst for change. All groups should develop a feeling of belonging without feeling that their traditions are threatened. Additionally, integration and contact can improves relations.’ (Paul Dixon, Lecture 5 notes)

(Jonathan Steele, 2008:228-9) argues that the problem of Iraq is not Shia-Sunni issue and is quite optimistic about the future of Iraq. He says: “A survey in January 2004, by the Iraq Center for Research and Strategic Studies, asked people which of the following expressions “suits you well”: Sunni Muslim, Shia Muslim, or Just Muslim. The biggest category, 39.9 per cent, chose the last option.” Consequently, he believes that it would be unfair if one sect or group is blamed for the war. There are multi-dimensional factors that generated conflict and enmity among the Iraqi communities.

As he goes on and says: “No single group can be blamed for Iraq’s devastating slide towards sectarian war. Saddam stared the rot. The Americans then played a significant part by emphasizing sectarian issues in their post-war policies. Iraqi Shia politicians and the death squads that were run by their militias compounded the problem and gave it a lethal dimension.” (Ibid)

Steele also emphasises that there are not much profound antagonism and hostility between Shias and Sunnis as many westerners think. He says: “Western analysts started to talk of civil war, but Iraqis were still denying that sectarianism was of any relevance. The subject was taboo. I found that out during a series of interviews in Sunni and Shia areas at the time.” (Ibid)

Steele, as an instrumentalist, wants to show that there will be no sectarian clashes in the future. He thinks that there is a well-integrated Shia minority, which shows little sectarian tendencies, and that it is the West, which provokes and inflames clashes between the Sunnis, Kurds and Shias for their own interests. Therefore, this group prescribes integration and the promotion of civil society. In addition to this, they also prescribe a Marshall plan for the country. As Eric Davis argues: “Given the nature of the crisis in Iraq, and its importance to the Middle East and larger global economy, what is needed is a bold policy initiative.”

Constructivism

Constructivist believes that ‘constructivism’ is an approach and not a theory like other schools of thoughts. Because theory could be an account of the world approach. However, constructivism is a framework to evaluate and examine different situations. They are skeptical of nationalism and are entirely against over-generalization and over-simplification. They tend to structure and agency. As (Paul Dixon, 2008:10) gives a profound explanations that: “Constructivism is an approach to analysing politics rather than a theory of politics. This framework can account for the variability in identities, both fluid and sticky or firm, and pays attention to the constraints and opportunities that face political elites in managing conflict.”

They are more prudent about over-simplification of Iraq and more eager to listen to different accounts and stories. They also see nationality and nationalism as fluid or sticky. Paul Dixon concluded by saying that: “For Constructivists, identities may be fluid and malleable or they may be ‘sticky’ and hard to change depending on the context. This makes Constructivists distinct from both the pessimistic, ‘conservative realist’, essentialism of Consociationalism and the over-optimistic, ‘idealism’, and radical instrumentalism of the Civil Society approach.” They are critical of ethnosectarism and have a clear tendency to both structure and agency approaches. As Paul Dixon argues that: “Constructivism rejects the over-generalised theories of both Consociationalists and advocates of the Civil Society approach in favour of analysing the particular contexts in which conflict arises.  The   concepts of structure/agency suggests that people do make their own history but that they do so within constraints.” No neutrality, therefore modesty. No grand theory, therefore, complexity. Constructivists are neither hard nor soft and not just how the world is but how it ought to be. They can see that Iraq is a state can be possible to rebuild. Because they believe in ‘Art of the Possible’. They also argue that the invention of culture and the imposition of that to the masses are misleading. “Top-down view of culture, or the idea of culture constructed purposefully by national elites and imposed on a relatively passive population, is seriously misleading. National identity is produced, reproduced and contested in the taken-for-granted details of social interaction, the habits and routines of everyday life.” Cited in (Ozkirimli, 2005: 191)

In addition, they believe that the observer is not neutral or objective, the world is complex. No one has a ‘scientific’ answer. Therefore, there are many ‘stories’ that can be told, and can be listened to. They believe there is not a specific grand theory which could tell you all about Iraq. However, there are multidimensional theories and approaches. The constructivist are quite pessimistic about groupist language, ‘Sunni’, ‘Shia’, ‘Kurd’, because they believe that the world can be made differently and they are matching problems with solutions or they are describing and prescribing the situation in Iraq depend on political context. In short, they are virtually flexible and deal with any situation in a divided society according their circumstances. (Paul Dixon, Lecture 10 notes)

Consociatonalism

Consociationalism is an approach to managing conflict, which draws on a primordial, or ethnosymbolist view of conflict. They describe Iraq as a fracturing and divided society and argue that partition could be a viable option.

According to (John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, 1996:333) “Partition resolves ethnic conflict, if works, by breaking up multi-ethnic states, or by allowing divorce between those ethnic communities which do not wish to live together in the same state... the in-vogue method of ethnic conflict-resolution. Iraq will be next if Iraqi Kurds are allowed to have their way.”  At the end they prescribe a “(federalism, arbitration and sociociationalims) have some record of success in stabilising deeply divided societies in ways compatible with liberal democracy norms.”

Consociationalism believes in limited reform and change, as they are segregationist and skeptical of democracy. They believe in top-down theory and cynical of bottom up approach. They are prone to power sharing. (McGarry, J. and O’Leary, 1993: 37) explained the process on this mode: “Consociational practices may work to calm ideological, religious, linguistic or ethnic conflicts, but only if these conflicts have not become the bases of separate national identities.” Therefore, segregation and inclusive power sharing could be the answer and recommendation.

Civil Society

Civil Society is an approach to managing conflict, which draws on an Instrumentalism view of conflict. The Civil Society approach description of conflict is quite the opposite of sociciationalism. Because, they are skeptical of sectarianism, discrimination and class inequalities. They are cautious about ‘Sunnis’, ‘Shias’ and ‘Kurds’ as they believe in a multi-cultural society. (Smooha, S. and Hanf, T., 1996:326-333) argue that for a conflict-regulation in deeply divided societies there should be a broad range of alternative. “They include genocide, forced removal, territorial partition, imposed assimilation, involuntary segregation, power sharing, open society and many variations and combinations of them.” In their conclusion they argue that: “liberal democracy fosters civility. It equates nationalism with citizenship and they sate with civil society.” They also prescribe democratisation, transparency, integrations and power sharing in society. In addition to this, they call for a Marshall Plan for Iraq because it decreases violence and increases job opportunities for youths.  

In sum, the Civil Society prescription for Iraq conflict is the bottom-up approach and advocates that the people and civil society should be mobilised against political elite. For examples, cross-communal contact and cooperation uplift the spirit of a community and bring unity among them.

Conclusion:

To return to the question posed in the title of this paper, which underlined the descriptions and prescriptions of primordialist, it found that ethnicity and nationalism are natural, and in our blood, and they prescribe repatriation, segregation and partition accordingly.

It also underscores the views and resolutions of ethnosymbolist who believe that there are clear evidence that Iraq is a fragmented and divided country made up of Kurds, Shia and Sunnis. Therefore, they recommend partition. Instrumentalism is the opposite of both primordialism and ethnosymbolisim. They believe that the Iraqi society is not as seriously fragmented as some suggest. The main problem is the political elite who manipulates public feelings and ethnicity to gain power and prestige. They, therefore, see integration is the best way forward.

Constructivists see Iraq in a different way and are against over-simplification and generalisation. They tend to listen and balance all stories. They are skeptical about consociationalism as well as nationalism. They problematise and dislocate consociationalism’s approach for its flawed and seriously misleading concept of democracy.

For Constructivists, identities may be fluid and malleable or they may be ‘sticky’ and hard to change depending on the context. This makes “Constructivists distinct from both the pessimistic, ‘conservative realist’, essentialism of Consociationalism and the over-optimistic, ‘idealism’ and radical instrumentalism of the Civil Society   approach.” They are pro integration.

In nutshell, it seems there are serious inconsistencies and cynicisms in consociationalism, which draws from both of ‘primordialism’ and ‘ethnosymbolisim’ prescriptions because they essentially insist on segregation, repartition and partition.

Instrumentalist’s approach of resolving conflicts, which draws on the promotion of a civil society, is also flawed and shallow. Because they are too pessimistic about the evil elites and by contrast too optimistic about integration and unification. However, Constructivism might be a relevant approach for managing and resolving that conflict. Because they have multi-disciplinary approaches, which means, they are against a grand theory, over-simplification and a scientific result. They are prone to diverse ingredients and rely on 'art of possible'. In another words, they believe that the world can be made differently and they are matching problems with solutions.

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